Recent Articles
Keynote Address - 2009 CASID Conference
“It has always been my firm belief that the main role intellectuals can play within society is to ask questions—particularly disturbing ones—and to view any commonly accepted assertion with deep suspicion. ‘Development’ is precisely one of these terms whose meaning seems so obvious as to be above criticism. The consensus around them is so broad that the mere fact of questioning them may lead either to deliberate incomprehension or unanimous condemnation. But I am ready to take the risk, quite knowingly. “First, I shall briefly give you my definition of ‘development,’ just to make sure that we know what we are talking about, and later, I shall try to show how ‘actually existing development’ is at the root not only of the present (economic and financial) crisis, but also of the many crises (over climate, energy resources, ecology, and food) that are threatening us. In the second part, I shall try to give examples as to why the various measures—mainly pertaining to economics—that are implemented to cope with these problems are unsuited to solving them.”
“En tant qu’analyse critique de l’existant, la contribution de M. Rist définit le ‘développement’ tel qu’il est : la ‘transformation (et la destruction) de la nature et des relations sociales en biens et services marchands afin de stimuler la croissance économique’ … “Là où je voudrais m’arrêter c’est sur cette notion de ‘développement’ tel qu’il est, une notion bien précise de croissance et une notion éminemment idéologique, pour souligner l’importance de savoir comment nous en sommes arrivés là. Ceci me parait central et tout à fait complémentaire à l’apport de M. Rist, pour savoir pourquoi d’autres chemins ne semblent pas possibles, ou ont été clairement écartés, et à quelles conditions ils pourraient devenir envisageables.”
Gouvernance, contestation et développement en Asie du Sud-Est
“À partir [d’un] point de départ voulant, qu’au fond, la gouvernance condense et résulte des rapports de forces politiques et socio-économiques à l’intérieur d’un État, il devient fascinant de tenter de saisir les dynamiques contemporaines qui marquent l’Asie du Sud-Est. De là, l’idée de comparer trois États (Laos, Malaisie et Philippines) qui offrent d’intéressants contrastes et paradoxes… Ainsi, la question qui traverse les quatre articles ici présentés est celle de comprendre l’agencement particulier des rapports de pouvoir non seulement au sein de l’État, mais aussi entre ses différents représentants et les forces politiques et sociales à l’extérieur de celui-ci. Comme le démontrent les quatre articles, cet agencement est à la fois relativement stable dans le temps, malgré diverses formes d’opposition parfois secrètes ou discrètes (par exemple : utilisation des nouvelles technologies du Web, petits projets de développement, formations sur les droits), ou parfois bruyantes et ouvertes (entre autres, mobilisation dans la rue, tentative de coup d’État ou encore lutte armée).”
The analysis of the Philippine state provides in-depth perspective in terms of both the typologies used and the breadth of the research conducted over the past 25 years. The establishment of the Marcos dictatorship in 1972 becomes the reference point for this multi-pronged analysis, with each subsequent regime compared to it. This period in Philippine history is often viewed as a quasi-caricatural extension of the political system which was widely entrenched during the American period (1898–1946). In this article, the author explores this wealth of literature from a unique standpoint, and explains the rise of a new form of neopatrimonialism manifested in the current oligarchic democracy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidency, dating from 2001. The striking consistency across various forms of neopatrimonial governance is also analyzed, beginning with the period extending from independence to the Marcos era (1972–1986), and continuing through the more recent and unconventional Joseph Estrada presidency from 1998 to 2001, up to the current regime of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
This article seeks to explain Malaysia’s remarkable political stability over more than 50 years. We offer a macro-level analysis of Malaysia’s rentier-based economy and a micro-level analysis of a political-corporate network of elite Malays as key factors. We argue that the Malay elite, by securing access to abundant rent, has designed, mobilized, and strengthened the state’s institutions at its discretion, in a way that provides broad redistribution while strengthening its own role. In contrast to James Scott’s theory on resistance against the elite, we argue that Malaysia’s elite generates collaboration and co-optation; these are the “weapons of the strong.”


